EtherGuard-VPN/device/receive.go
Josh Bleecher Snyder 0bcb822e5b device: overhaul device state management
This commit simplifies device state management.
It creates a single unified state variable and documents its semantics.

It also makes state changes more atomic.
As an example of the sort of bug that occurred due to non-atomic state changes,
the following sequence of events used to occur approximately every 2.5 million test runs:

* RoutineTUNEventReader received an EventDown event.
* It called device.Down, which called device.setUpDown.
* That set device.state.changing, but did not yet attempt to lock device.state.Mutex.
* Test completion called device.Close.
* device.Close locked device.state.Mutex.
* device.Close blocked on a call to device.state.stopping.Wait.
* device.setUpDown then attempted to lock device.state.Mutex and blocked.

Deadlock results. setUpDown cannot progress because device.state.Mutex is locked.
Until setUpDown returns, RoutineTUNEventReader cannot call device.state.stopping.Done.
Until device.state.stopping.Done gets called, device.state.stopping.Wait is blocked.
As long as device.state.stopping.Wait is blocked, device.state.Mutex cannot be unlocked.
This commit fixes that deadlock by holding device.state.mu
when checking that the device is not closed.

Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2021-02-08 10:32:07 -08:00

491 lines
12 KiB
Go

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2021 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package device
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"net"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/conn"
)
type QueueHandshakeElement struct {
msgType uint32
packet []byte
endpoint conn.Endpoint
buffer *[MaxMessageSize]byte
}
type QueueInboundElement struct {
sync.Mutex
buffer *[MaxMessageSize]byte
packet []byte
counter uint64
keypair *Keypair
endpoint conn.Endpoint
}
// clearPointers clears elem fields that contain pointers.
// This makes the garbage collector's life easier and
// avoids accidentally keeping other objects around unnecessarily.
// It also reduces the possible collateral damage from use-after-free bugs.
func (elem *QueueInboundElement) clearPointers() {
elem.buffer = nil
elem.packet = nil
elem.keypair = nil
elem.endpoint = nil
}
/* Called when a new authenticated message has been received
*
* NOTE: Not thread safe, but called by sequential receiver!
*/
func (peer *Peer) keepKeyFreshReceiving() {
if peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Get() {
return
}
keypair := peer.keypairs.Current()
if keypair != nil && keypair.isInitiator && time.Since(keypair.created) > (RejectAfterTime-KeepaliveTimeout-RekeyTimeout) {
peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Set(true)
peer.SendHandshakeInitiation(false)
}
}
/* Receives incoming datagrams for the device
*
* Every time the bind is updated a new routine is started for
* IPv4 and IPv6 (separately)
*/
func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(IP int, bind conn.Bind) {
defer func() {
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming IPv%d - stopped", IP)
device.queue.decryption.wg.Done()
device.queue.handshake.wg.Done()
device.net.stopping.Done()
}()
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming IPv%d - started", IP)
// receive datagrams until conn is closed
buffer := device.GetMessageBuffer()
var (
err error
size int
endpoint conn.Endpoint
deathSpiral int
)
for {
switch IP {
case ipv4.Version:
size, endpoint, err = bind.ReceiveIPv4(buffer[:])
case ipv6.Version:
size, endpoint, err = bind.ReceiveIPv6(buffer[:])
default:
panic("invalid IP version")
}
if err != nil {
device.PutMessageBuffer(buffer)
if errors.Is(err, conn.NetErrClosed) {
return
}
device.log.Errorf("Failed to receive packet: %v", err)
if deathSpiral < 10 {
deathSpiral++
time.Sleep(time.Second / 3)
continue
}
return
}
deathSpiral = 0
if size < MinMessageSize {
continue
}
// check size of packet
packet := buffer[:size]
msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[:4])
var okay bool
switch msgType {
// check if transport
case MessageTransportType:
// check size
if len(packet) < MessageTransportSize {
continue
}
// lookup key pair
receiver := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(
packet[MessageTransportOffsetReceiver:MessageTransportOffsetCounter],
)
value := device.indexTable.Lookup(receiver)
keypair := value.keypair
if keypair == nil {
continue
}
// check keypair expiry
if keypair.created.Add(RejectAfterTime).Before(time.Now()) {
continue
}
// create work element
peer := value.peer
elem := device.GetInboundElement()
elem.packet = packet
elem.buffer = buffer
elem.keypair = keypair
elem.endpoint = endpoint
elem.counter = 0
elem.Mutex = sync.Mutex{}
elem.Lock()
// add to decryption queues
peer.queue.RLock()
if peer.isRunning.Get() {
peer.queue.inbound <- elem
device.queue.decryption.c <- elem
buffer = device.GetMessageBuffer()
} else {
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
}
peer.queue.RUnlock()
continue
// otherwise it is a fixed size & handshake related packet
case MessageInitiationType:
okay = len(packet) == MessageInitiationSize
case MessageResponseType:
okay = len(packet) == MessageResponseSize
case MessageCookieReplyType:
okay = len(packet) == MessageCookieReplySize
default:
device.log.Verbosef("Received message with unknown type")
}
if okay {
select {
case device.queue.handshake.c <- QueueHandshakeElement{
msgType: msgType,
buffer: buffer,
packet: packet,
endpoint: endpoint,
}:
buffer = device.GetMessageBuffer()
default:
}
}
}
}
func (device *Device) RoutineDecryption() {
var nonce [chacha20poly1305.NonceSize]byte
defer device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker - stopped")
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker - started")
for elem := range device.queue.decryption.c {
// split message into fields
counter := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetCounter:MessageTransportOffsetContent]
content := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetContent:]
// decrypt and release to consumer
var err error
elem.counter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(counter)
// copy counter to nonce
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nonce[0x4:0xc], elem.counter)
elem.packet, err = elem.keypair.receive.Open(
content[:0],
nonce[:],
content,
nil,
)
if err != nil {
elem.packet = nil
}
elem.Unlock()
}
}
/* Handles incoming packets related to handshake
*/
func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake() {
defer device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker - stopped")
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker - started")
for elem := range device.queue.handshake.c {
// handle cookie fields and ratelimiting
switch elem.msgType {
case MessageCookieReplyType:
// unmarshal packet
var reply MessageCookieReply
reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet)
err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &reply)
if err != nil {
device.log.Verbosef("Failed to decode cookie reply")
goto skip
}
// lookup peer from index
entry := device.indexTable.Lookup(reply.Receiver)
if entry.peer == nil {
goto skip
}
// consume reply
if peer := entry.peer; peer.isRunning.Get() {
device.log.Verbosef("Receiving cookie response from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString())
if !peer.cookieGenerator.ConsumeReply(&reply) {
device.log.Verbosef("Could not decrypt invalid cookie response")
}
}
goto skip
case MessageInitiationType, MessageResponseType:
// check mac fields and maybe ratelimit
if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC1(elem.packet) {
device.log.Verbosef("Received packet with invalid mac1")
goto skip
}
// endpoints destination address is the source of the datagram
if device.IsUnderLoad() {
// verify MAC2 field
if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC2(elem.packet, elem.endpoint.DstToBytes()) {
device.SendHandshakeCookie(&elem)
goto skip
}
// check ratelimiter
if !device.rate.limiter.Allow(elem.endpoint.DstIP()) {
goto skip
}
}
default:
device.log.Errorf("Invalid packet ended up in the handshake queue")
goto skip
}
// handle handshake initiation/response content
switch elem.msgType {
case MessageInitiationType:
// unmarshal
var msg MessageInitiation
reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet)
err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msg)
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode initiation message")
goto skip
}
// consume initiation
peer := device.ConsumeMessageInitiation(&msg)
if peer == nil {
device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid initiation message from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString())
goto skip
}
// update timers
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
// update endpoint
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake initiation", peer)
atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet)))
peer.SendHandshakeResponse()
case MessageResponseType:
// unmarshal
var msg MessageResponse
reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet)
err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msg)
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode response message")
goto skip
}
// consume response
peer := device.ConsumeMessageResponse(&msg)
if peer == nil {
device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid response message from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString())
goto skip
}
// update endpoint
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake response", peer)
atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet)))
// update timers
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
// derive keypair
err = peer.BeginSymmetricSession()
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to derive keypair: %v", peer, err)
goto skip
}
peer.timersSessionDerived()
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
skip:
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
}
}
func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialReceiver() {
device := peer.device
defer func() {
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - stopped", peer)
peer.stopping.Done()
}()
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - started", peer)
for elem := range peer.queue.inbound {
var err error
elem.Lock()
if elem.packet == nil {
// decryption failed
goto skip
}
if !elem.keypair.replayFilter.ValidateCounter(elem.counter, RejectAfterMessages) {
goto skip
}
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) {
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet)+MinMessageSize))
if len(elem.packet) == 0 {
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Receiving keepalive packet", peer)
goto skip
}
peer.timersDataReceived()
switch elem.packet[0] >> 4 {
case ipv4.Version:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
goto skip
}
field := elem.packet[IPv4offsetTotalLength : IPv4offsetTotalLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) || int(length) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
goto skip
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len]
if device.allowedips.LookupIPv4(src) != peer {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv4 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
goto skip
}
case ipv6.Version:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
goto skip
}
field := elem.packet[IPv6offsetPayloadLength : IPv6offsetPayloadLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
length += ipv6.HeaderLen
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) {
goto skip
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len]
if device.allowedips.LookupIPv6(src) != peer {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv6 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
goto skip
}
default:
device.log.Verbosef("Packet with invalid IP version from %v", peer)
goto skip
}
_, err = device.tun.device.Write(elem.buffer[:MessageTransportOffsetContent+len(elem.packet)], MessageTransportOffsetContent)
if err != nil && !device.isClosed() {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to write packet to TUN device: %v", err)
}
if len(peer.queue.inbound) == 0 {
err = device.tun.device.Flush()
if err != nil {
peer.device.log.Errorf("Unable to flush packets: %v", err)
}
}
skip:
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
}
}