Now measures over an entire update, which should hopefully give us more
stable values. They are still small values for fast networks though so
increase precision in the values we keep.
If using SSecurityPlain and the user specifies an empty username
and password, it will invoke InStream::checkNoWait(0) which will
cause a division by zero when calculating the number of available
items.
Enhance InStream::check() to behave properly when asked for
zero items, or zero sized items.
Add comments to InStream::check(), InStream::checkNoWait(),
and InStream::readBytes() to document expected behaviour
when requested to check or read zero items, or an item with
zero size.
Created a new subclass of Exception called GAIException() that will
handle error messages from getaddrinfo() instead of letting Exception()
handle it. GAIException() will make use of gai_strerror() to map the
error code to text. On Windows, gai_strerrorW() must be used if the text
is encoded with UTF-8.
The previous error messages did not support Unicode characters. This
commit will use UTF-8 encoding to be able to display error messages in
every language.
There might be more bytes left in the current TLS record, even if
there is nothing on the underlying stream. Make sure we properly
return this when we aren't being requested to block.
We use a lot of lengths given to us over the network, so be more
paranoid about them causing an overflow as otherwise an attacker
might trick us in to overwriting other memory.
This primarily affects the client which often gets lengths from the
server, but there are also some scenarios where the server might
theoretically be vulnerable.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.
Provides safety against them accidentally becoming negative because
of bugs in the calculations.
Also does the same to CharArray and friends as they were strongly
connection to the stream objects.
Move the checks around to avoid missing cases where we might access
memory that is no longer valid. Also avoid touching the underlying
stream implicitly (e.g. via the destructor) as it might also no
longer be valid.
A malicious server could theoretically use this for remote code
execution in the client.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab
