This change adds support for the VMware Mouse Position
pseudo-encoding[1], which is used to notify VNC clients when X11 clients
call `XWarpPointer()`[2]. This function is called by SDL (and other
similar libraries) when they detect that the server does not support
native relative motion, like some RFB clients.
With this, RFB clients can choose to adjust the local cursor position
under certain circumstances to match what the server has set. For
instance, if pointer lock has been enabled on the client's machine and
the cursor is not being drawn locally, the local position of the cursor
is irrelevant, so the RFB client can use what the server sends as the
canonical absolute position of the cursor. This ultimately enables the
possibility of games (especially FPS games) to behave how users expect
(if the clients implement the corresponding change).
Part of: #619
1: https://github.com/rfbproto/rfbproto/blob/master/rfbproto.rst#vmware-cursor-position-pseudo-encoding
2: https://tronche.com/gui/x/xlib/input/XWarpPointer.html
3: https://hg.libsdl.org/SDL/file/28e3b60e2131/src/events/SDL_mouse.c#l804
We computed a safe area if a client gave us a bogus one, but we didn't
actually use it. Fix this properly and make sure we don't pass on bad
coordinates further.
We can't safely use the normal timers in base classes as we cannot
guarantee that subclasses will call the base class' handleTimeout()
properly if the subclass overrides it.
Our fast paths assume that each channel fits in to a separate byte.
That means the shift needs to be a multiple of 8. Start actually
checking this so that a client cannot trip us up and possibly cause
incorrect code exection.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.
Provides safety against them accidentally becoming negative because
of bugs in the calculations.
Also does the same to CharArray and friends as they were strongly
connection to the stream objects.
Otherwise we might be tricked in to reading and writing things at
incorrect offsets for pixels which ultimately could result in an
attacker writing things to the stack or heap and executing things
they shouldn't.
This only affects the server as the client never uses the pixel
format suggested by th server.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.
We always assumed there would be one pixel per row so a rect with
a zero width would result in us writing to unknown memory.
This could theoretically be used by a malicious server to inject
code in to the viewer process.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.
Move the checks around to avoid missing cases where we might access
memory that is no longer valid. Also avoid touching the underlying
stream implicitly (e.g. via the destructor) as it might also no
longer be valid.
A malicious server could theoretically use this for remote code
execution in the client.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab
