netbird/management/server/grpcserver.go
2024-08-14 13:30:10 +03:00

768 lines
27 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"time"
pb "github.com/golang/protobuf/proto" // nolint
"github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/timestamp"
"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/v2/interceptors/realip"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
nbContext "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/context"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/posture"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/encryption"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/jwtclaims"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
internalStatus "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/telemetry"
)
// GRPCServer an instance of a Management gRPC API server
type GRPCServer struct {
accountManager AccountManager
wgKey wgtypes.Key
proto.UnimplementedManagementServiceServer
peersUpdateManager *PeersUpdateManager
config *Config
turnCredentialsManager TURNCredentialsManager
jwtValidator *jwtclaims.JWTValidator
jwtClaimsExtractor *jwtclaims.ClaimsExtractor
appMetrics telemetry.AppMetrics
ephemeralManager *EphemeralManager
}
// NewServer creates a new Management server
func NewServer(ctx context.Context, config *Config, accountManager AccountManager, peersUpdateManager *PeersUpdateManager, turnCredentialsManager TURNCredentialsManager, appMetrics telemetry.AppMetrics, ephemeralManager *EphemeralManager) (*GRPCServer, error) {
key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var jwtValidator *jwtclaims.JWTValidator
if config.HttpConfig != nil && config.HttpConfig.AuthIssuer != "" && config.HttpConfig.AuthAudience != "" && validateURL(config.HttpConfig.AuthKeysLocation) {
jwtValidator, err = jwtclaims.NewJWTValidator(
ctx,
config.HttpConfig.AuthIssuer,
config.GetAuthAudiences(),
config.HttpConfig.AuthKeysLocation,
config.HttpConfig.IdpSignKeyRefreshEnabled,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "unable to create new jwt middleware, err: %v", err)
}
} else {
log.WithContext(ctx).Debug("unable to use http config to create new jwt middleware")
}
if appMetrics != nil {
// update gauge based on number of connected peers which is equal to open gRPC streams
err = appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().RegisterConnectedStreams(func() int64 {
return int64(len(peersUpdateManager.peerChannels))
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
var audience, userIDClaim string
if config.HttpConfig != nil {
audience = config.HttpConfig.AuthAudience
userIDClaim = config.HttpConfig.AuthUserIDClaim
}
jwtClaimsExtractor := jwtclaims.NewClaimsExtractor(
jwtclaims.WithAudience(audience),
jwtclaims.WithUserIDClaim(userIDClaim),
)
return &GRPCServer{
wgKey: key,
// peerKey -> event channel
peersUpdateManager: peersUpdateManager,
accountManager: accountManager,
config: config,
turnCredentialsManager: turnCredentialsManager,
jwtValidator: jwtValidator,
jwtClaimsExtractor: jwtClaimsExtractor,
appMetrics: appMetrics,
ephemeralManager: ephemeralManager,
}, nil
}
func (s *GRPCServer) GetServerKey(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Empty) (*proto.ServerKeyResponse, error) {
// todo introduce something more meaningful with the key expiration/rotation
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().CountGetKeyRequest()
}
now := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
secs := int64(now.Second())
nanos := int32(now.Nanosecond())
expiresAt := &timestamp.Timestamp{Seconds: secs, Nanos: nanos}
return &proto.ServerKeyResponse{
Key: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
}, nil
}
func getRealIP(ctx context.Context) net.IP {
if addr, ok := realip.FromContext(ctx); ok {
return net.IP(addr.AsSlice())
}
return nil
}
// Sync validates the existence of a connecting peer, sends an initial state (all available for the connecting peers) and
// notifies the connected peer of any updates (e.g. new peers under the same account)
func (s *GRPCServer) Sync(req *proto.EncryptedMessage, srv proto.ManagementService_SyncServer) error {
reqStart := time.Now()
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().CountSyncRequest()
}
ctx := srv.Context()
realIP := getRealIP(ctx)
syncReq := &proto.SyncRequest{}
peerKey, err := s.parseRequest(ctx, req, syncReq)
if err != nil {
return err
}
//nolint
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.PeerIDKey, peerKey.String())
accountID, err := s.accountManager.GetAccountIDForPeerKey(ctx, peerKey.String())
if err != nil {
// this case should not happen and already indicates an issue but we don't want the system to fail due to being unable to log in detail
accountID = "UNKNOWN"
}
//nolint
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.AccountIDKey, accountID)
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("Sync request from peer [%s] [%s]", req.WgPubKey, realIP.String())
if syncReq.GetMeta() == nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Tracef("peer system meta has to be provided on sync. Peer %s, remote addr %s", peerKey.String(), realIP)
}
peer, netMap, postureChecks, err := s.accountManager.SyncAndMarkPeer(ctx, accountID, peerKey.String(), extractPeerMeta(ctx, syncReq.GetMeta()), realIP)
if err != nil {
return mapError(ctx, err)
}
err = s.sendInitialSync(ctx, peerKey, peer, netMap, postureChecks, srv)
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("error while sending initial sync for %s: %v", peerKey.String(), err)
return err
}
updates := s.peersUpdateManager.CreateChannel(ctx, peer.ID)
s.ephemeralManager.OnPeerConnected(ctx, peer)
if s.config.TURNConfig.TimeBasedCredentials {
s.turnCredentialsManager.SetupRefresh(ctx, peer.ID)
}
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().CountSyncRequestDuration(time.Since(reqStart))
}
return s.handleUpdates(ctx, accountID, peerKey, peer, updates, srv)
}
// handleUpdates sends updates to the connected peer until the updates channel is closed.
func (s *GRPCServer) handleUpdates(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peerKey wgtypes.Key, peer *nbpeer.Peer, updates chan *UpdateMessage, srv proto.ManagementService_SyncServer) error {
for {
select {
// condition when there are some updates
case update, open := <-updates:
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().UpdateChannelQueueLength(len(updates) + 1)
}
if !open {
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("updates channel for peer %s was closed", peerKey.String())
s.cancelPeerRoutines(ctx, accountID, peer)
return nil
}
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("received an update for peer %s", peerKey.String())
if err := s.sendUpdate(ctx, accountID, peerKey, peer, update, srv); err != nil {
return err
}
// condition when client <-> server connection has been terminated
case <-srv.Context().Done():
// happens when connection drops, e.g. client disconnects
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("stream of peer %s has been closed", peerKey.String())
s.cancelPeerRoutines(ctx, accountID, peer)
return srv.Context().Err()
}
}
}
// sendUpdate encrypts the update message using the peer key and the server's wireguard key,
// then sends the encrypted message to the connected peer via the sync server.
func (s *GRPCServer) sendUpdate(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peerKey wgtypes.Key, peer *nbpeer.Peer, update *UpdateMessage, srv proto.ManagementService_SyncServer) error {
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, update.Update)
if err != nil {
s.cancelPeerRoutines(ctx, accountID, peer)
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed processing update message")
}
err = srv.SendMsg(&proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
Body: encryptedResp,
})
if err != nil {
s.cancelPeerRoutines(ctx, accountID, peer)
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed sending update message")
}
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("sent an update to peer %s", peerKey.String())
return nil
}
func (s *GRPCServer) cancelPeerRoutines(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peer *nbpeer.Peer) {
s.peersUpdateManager.CloseChannel(ctx, peer.ID)
s.turnCredentialsManager.CancelRefresh(peer.ID)
_ = s.accountManager.OnPeerDisconnected(ctx, accountID, peer.Key)
s.ephemeralManager.OnPeerDisconnected(ctx, peer)
}
func (s *GRPCServer) validateToken(ctx context.Context, jwtToken string) (string, error) {
if s.jwtValidator == nil {
return "", status.Error(codes.Internal, "no jwt validator set")
}
token, err := s.jwtValidator.ValidateAndParse(ctx, jwtToken)
if err != nil {
return "", status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid jwt token, err: %v", err)
}
claims := s.jwtClaimsExtractor.FromToken(token)
// we need to call this method because if user is new, we will automatically add it to existing or create a new account
_, _, err = s.accountManager.GetAccountFromToken(ctx, claims)
if err != nil {
return "", status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "unable to fetch account with claims, err: %v", err)
}
if err := s.accountManager.CheckUserAccessByJWTGroups(ctx, claims); err != nil {
return "", status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, err.Error())
}
return claims.UserId, nil
}
// maps internal internalStatus.Error to gRPC status.Error
func mapError(ctx context.Context, err error) error {
if e, ok := internalStatus.FromError(err); ok {
switch e.Type() {
case internalStatus.PermissionDenied:
return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, e.Message)
case internalStatus.Unauthorized:
return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, e.Message)
case internalStatus.Unauthenticated:
return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, e.Message)
case internalStatus.PreconditionFailed:
return status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, e.Message)
case internalStatus.NotFound:
return status.Error(codes.NotFound, e.Message)
default:
}
}
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("got an unhandled error: %s", err)
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed handling request")
}
func extractPeerMeta(ctx context.Context, meta *proto.PeerSystemMeta) nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta {
if meta == nil {
return nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{}
}
osVersion := meta.GetOSVersion()
if osVersion == "" {
osVersion = meta.GetCore()
}
networkAddresses := make([]nbpeer.NetworkAddress, 0, len(meta.GetNetworkAddresses()))
for _, addr := range meta.GetNetworkAddresses() {
netAddr, err := netip.ParsePrefix(addr.GetNetIP())
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed to parse netip address, %s: %v", addr.GetNetIP(), err)
continue
}
networkAddresses = append(networkAddresses, nbpeer.NetworkAddress{
NetIP: netAddr,
Mac: addr.GetMac(),
})
}
files := make([]nbpeer.File, 0, len(meta.GetFiles()))
for _, file := range meta.GetFiles() {
files = append(files, nbpeer.File{
Path: file.GetPath(),
Exist: file.GetExist(),
ProcessIsRunning: file.GetProcessIsRunning(),
})
}
return nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{
Hostname: meta.GetHostname(),
GoOS: meta.GetGoOS(),
Kernel: meta.GetKernel(),
Platform: meta.GetPlatform(),
OS: meta.GetOS(),
OSVersion: osVersion,
WtVersion: meta.GetWiretrusteeVersion(),
UIVersion: meta.GetUiVersion(),
KernelVersion: meta.GetKernelVersion(),
NetworkAddresses: networkAddresses,
SystemSerialNumber: meta.GetSysSerialNumber(),
SystemProductName: meta.GetSysProductName(),
SystemManufacturer: meta.GetSysManufacturer(),
Environment: nbpeer.Environment{
Cloud: meta.GetEnvironment().GetCloud(),
Platform: meta.GetEnvironment().GetPlatform(),
},
Files: files,
}
}
func (s *GRPCServer) parseRequest(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage, parsed pb.Message) (wgtypes.Key, error) {
peerKey, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(req.GetWgPubKey())
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("error while parsing peer's WireGuard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
return wgtypes.Key{}, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "provided wgPubKey %s is invalid", req.WgPubKey)
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, req.Body, parsed)
if err != nil {
return wgtypes.Key{}, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid request message")
}
return peerKey, nil
}
// Login endpoint first checks whether peer is registered under any account
// In case it is, the login is successful
// In case it isn't, the endpoint checks whether setup key is provided within the request and tries to register a peer.
// In case of the successful registration login is also successful
func (s *GRPCServer) Login(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
reqStart := time.Now()
defer func() {
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().CountLoginRequestDuration(time.Since(reqStart))
}
}()
if s.appMetrics != nil {
s.appMetrics.GRPCMetrics().CountLoginRequest()
}
realIP := getRealIP(ctx)
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("Login request from peer [%s] [%s]", req.WgPubKey, realIP.String())
loginReq := &proto.LoginRequest{}
peerKey, err := s.parseRequest(ctx, req, loginReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
//nolint
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.PeerIDKey, peerKey.String())
accountID, err := s.accountManager.GetAccountIDForPeerKey(ctx, peerKey.String())
if err != nil {
// this case should not happen and already indicates an issue but we don't want the system to fail due to being unable to log in detail
accountID = "UNKNOWN"
}
//nolint
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.AccountIDKey, accountID)
if loginReq.GetMeta() == nil {
msg := status.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition,
"peer system meta has to be provided to log in. Peer %s, remote addr %s", peerKey.String(), realIP)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(msg)
return nil, msg
}
userID, err := s.processJwtToken(ctx, loginReq, peerKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var sshKey []byte
if loginReq.GetPeerKeys() != nil {
sshKey = loginReq.GetPeerKeys().GetSshPubKey()
}
peer, netMap, postureChecks, err := s.accountManager.LoginPeer(ctx, PeerLogin{
WireGuardPubKey: peerKey.String(),
SSHKey: string(sshKey),
Meta: extractPeerMeta(ctx, loginReq.GetMeta()),
UserID: userID,
SetupKey: loginReq.GetSetupKey(),
ConnectionIP: realIP,
})
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed logging in peer %s: %s", peerKey, err)
return nil, mapError(ctx, err)
}
// if the login request contains setup key then it is a registration request
if loginReq.GetSetupKey() != "" {
s.ephemeralManager.OnPeerDisconnected(ctx, peer)
}
// if peer has reached this point then it has logged in
loginResp := &proto.LoginResponse{
WiretrusteeConfig: toWiretrusteeConfig(s.config, nil),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, netMap.Network, s.accountManager.GetDNSDomain()),
Checks: toProtocolChecks(ctx, postureChecks),
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, loginResp)
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed encrypting peer %s message", peer.ID)
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed logging in peer")
}
return &proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
Body: encryptedResp,
}, nil
}
// processJwtToken validates the existence of a JWT token in the login request, and returns the corresponding user ID if
// the token is valid.
//
// The user ID can be empty if the token is not provided, which is acceptable if the peer is already
// registered or if it uses a setup key to register.
func (s *GRPCServer) processJwtToken(ctx context.Context, loginReq *proto.LoginRequest, peerKey wgtypes.Key) (string, error) {
userID := ""
if loginReq.GetJwtToken() != "" {
var err error
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
userID, err = s.validateToken(ctx, loginReq.GetJwtToken())
if err == nil {
break
}
log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed validating JWT token sent from peer %s with error %v. "+
"Trying again as it may be due to the IdP cache issue", peerKey.String(), err)
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
return userID, nil
}
func ToResponseProto(configProto Protocol) proto.HostConfig_Protocol {
switch configProto {
case UDP:
return proto.HostConfig_UDP
case DTLS:
return proto.HostConfig_DTLS
case HTTP:
return proto.HostConfig_HTTP
case HTTPS:
return proto.HostConfig_HTTPS
case TCP:
return proto.HostConfig_TCP
default:
panic(fmt.Errorf("unexpected config protocol type %v", configProto))
}
}
func toWiretrusteeConfig(config *Config, turnCredentials *TURNCredentials) *proto.WiretrusteeConfig {
if config == nil {
return nil
}
var stuns []*proto.HostConfig
for _, stun := range config.Stuns {
stuns = append(stuns, &proto.HostConfig{
Uri: stun.URI,
Protocol: ToResponseProto(stun.Proto),
})
}
var turns []*proto.ProtectedHostConfig
for _, turn := range config.TURNConfig.Turns {
var username string
var password string
if turnCredentials != nil {
username = turnCredentials.Username
password = turnCredentials.Password
} else {
username = turn.Username
password = turn.Password
}
turns = append(turns, &proto.ProtectedHostConfig{
HostConfig: &proto.HostConfig{
Uri: turn.URI,
Protocol: ToResponseProto(turn.Proto),
},
User: username,
Password: password,
})
}
return &proto.WiretrusteeConfig{
Stuns: stuns,
Turns: turns,
Signal: &proto.HostConfig{
Uri: config.Signal.URI,
Protocol: ToResponseProto(config.Signal.Proto),
},
}
}
func toPeerConfig(peer *nbpeer.Peer, network *Network, dnsName string) *proto.PeerConfig {
netmask, _ := network.Net.Mask.Size()
fqdn := peer.FQDN(dnsName)
return &proto.PeerConfig{
Address: fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", peer.IP.String(), netmask), // take it from the network
SshConfig: &proto.SSHConfig{SshEnabled: peer.SSHEnabled},
Fqdn: fqdn,
}
}
func toSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *Config, peer *nbpeer.Peer, turnCredentials *TURNCredentials, networkMap *NetworkMap, dnsName string, checks []*posture.Checks, dnsCache *DNSConfigCache) *proto.SyncResponse {
response := &proto.SyncResponse{
WiretrusteeConfig: toWiretrusteeConfig(config, turnCredentials),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName),
NetworkMap: &proto.NetworkMap{
Serial: networkMap.Network.CurrentSerial(),
Routes: toProtocolRoutes(networkMap.Routes),
DNSConfig: toProtocolDNSConfig(networkMap.DNSConfig, dnsCache),
},
Checks: toProtocolChecks(ctx, checks),
}
response.NetworkMap.PeerConfig = response.PeerConfig
allPeers := make([]*proto.RemotePeerConfig, 0, len(networkMap.Peers)+len(networkMap.OfflinePeers))
allPeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(allPeers, networkMap.Peers, dnsName)
response.RemotePeers = allPeers
response.NetworkMap.RemotePeers = allPeers
response.RemotePeersIsEmpty = len(allPeers) == 0
response.NetworkMap.RemotePeersIsEmpty = response.RemotePeersIsEmpty
response.NetworkMap.OfflinePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(nil, networkMap.OfflinePeers, dnsName)
firewallRules := toProtocolFirewallRules(networkMap.FirewallRules)
response.NetworkMap.FirewallRules = firewallRules
response.NetworkMap.FirewallRulesIsEmpty = len(firewallRules) == 0
return response
}
func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
for _, rPeer := range peers {
dst = append(dst, &proto.RemotePeerConfig{
WgPubKey: rPeer.Key,
AllowedIps: []string{rPeer.IP.String() + "/32"},
SshConfig: &proto.SSHConfig{SshPubKey: []byte(rPeer.SSHKey)},
Fqdn: rPeer.FQDN(dnsName),
})
}
return dst
}
// IsHealthy indicates whether the service is healthy
func (s *GRPCServer) IsHealthy(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Empty) (*proto.Empty, error) {
return &proto.Empty{}, nil
}
// sendInitialSync sends initial proto.SyncResponse to the peer requesting synchronization
func (s *GRPCServer) sendInitialSync(ctx context.Context, peerKey wgtypes.Key, peer *nbpeer.Peer, networkMap *NetworkMap, postureChecks []*posture.Checks, srv proto.ManagementService_SyncServer) error {
// make secret time based TURN credentials optional
var turnCredentials *TURNCredentials
if s.config.TURNConfig.TimeBasedCredentials {
creds := s.turnCredentialsManager.GenerateCredentials()
turnCredentials = &creds
} else {
turnCredentials = nil
}
plainResp := toSyncResponse(ctx, s.config, peer, turnCredentials, networkMap, s.accountManager.GetDNSDomain(), postureChecks, nil)
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, plainResp)
if err != nil {
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "error handling request")
}
err = srv.Send(&proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
Body: encryptedResp,
})
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed sending SyncResponse %v", err)
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "error handling request")
}
return nil
}
// GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow returns a device authorization flow information
// This is used for initiating an Oauth 2 device authorization grant flow
// which will be used by our clients to Login
func (s *GRPCServer) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
peerKey, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(req.GetWgPubKey())
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while parsing peer's Wireguard public key %s on GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow request.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, errMSG)
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, req.Body, &proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlowRequest{})
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while decrypting peer's message with Wireguard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, errMSG)
}
if s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow == nil || s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.Provider == string(NONE) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "no device authorization flow information available")
}
provider, ok := proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlowProvider_value[strings.ToUpper(s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.Provider)]
if !ok {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "no provider found in the protocol for %s", s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.Provider)
}
flowInfoResp := &proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow{
Provider: proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlowProvider(provider),
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
ClientID: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientID,
ClientSecret: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret,
Domain: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Domain,
Audience: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Audience,
DeviceAuthEndpoint: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.DeviceAuthEndpoint,
TokenEndpoint: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.TokenEndpoint,
Scope: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Scope,
UseIDToken: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.UseIDToken,
},
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, flowInfoResp)
if err != nil {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to encrypt no device authorization flow information")
}
return &proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
Body: encryptedResp,
}, nil
}
// GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow returns a pkce authorization flow information
// This is used for initiating an Oauth 2 pkce authorization grant flow
// which will be used by our clients to Login
func (s *GRPCServer) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
peerKey, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(req.GetWgPubKey())
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while parsing peer's Wireguard public key %s on GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow request.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, errMSG)
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, req.Body, &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{})
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while decrypting peer's message with Wireguard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, errMSG)
}
if s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow == nil {
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "no pkce authorization flow information available")
}
flowInfoResp := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
Audience: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Audience,
ClientID: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientID,
ClientSecret: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret,
TokenEndpoint: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.TokenEndpoint,
AuthorizationEndpoint: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.AuthorizationEndpoint,
Scope: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Scope,
RedirectURLs: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.RedirectURLs,
UseIDToken: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.UseIDToken,
},
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, s.wgKey, flowInfoResp)
if err != nil {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to encrypt no pkce authorization flow information")
}
return &proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: s.wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
Body: encryptedResp,
}, nil
}
// SyncMeta endpoint is used to synchronize peer's system metadata and notifies the connected,
// peer's under the same account of any updates.
func (s *GRPCServer) SyncMeta(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.Empty, error) {
realIP := getRealIP(ctx)
log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("Sync meta request from peer [%s] [%s]", req.WgPubKey, realIP.String())
syncMetaReq := &proto.SyncMetaRequest{}
peerKey, err := s.parseRequest(ctx, req, syncMetaReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if syncMetaReq.GetMeta() == nil {
msg := status.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition,
"peer system meta has to be provided on sync. Peer %s, remote addr %s", peerKey.String(), realIP)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(msg)
return nil, msg
}
err = s.accountManager.SyncPeerMeta(ctx, peerKey.String(), extractPeerMeta(ctx, syncMetaReq.GetMeta()))
if err != nil {
return nil, mapError(ctx, err)
}
return &proto.Empty{}, nil
}
// toProtocolChecks converts posture checks to protocol checks.
func toProtocolChecks(ctx context.Context, postureChecks []*posture.Checks) []*proto.Checks {
protoChecks := make([]*proto.Checks, 0, len(postureChecks))
for _, postureCheck := range postureChecks {
protoChecks = append(protoChecks, toProtocolCheck(postureCheck))
}
return protoChecks
}
// toProtocolCheck converts a posture.Checks to a proto.Checks.
func toProtocolCheck(postureCheck *posture.Checks) *proto.Checks {
protoCheck := &proto.Checks{}
if check := postureCheck.Checks.ProcessCheck; check != nil {
for _, process := range check.Processes {
if process.LinuxPath != "" {
protoCheck.Files = append(protoCheck.Files, process.LinuxPath)
}
if process.MacPath != "" {
protoCheck.Files = append(protoCheck.Files, process.MacPath)
}
if process.WindowsPath != "" {
protoCheck.Files = append(protoCheck.Files, process.WindowsPath)
}
}
}
return protoCheck
}