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Don't run .sh files with /bin/sh (#8951)

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# Description

The previous behaviour broke for me because I didn't have `sh` in my
path for my nu script. I think we shouldn't assume that just because a
file ends with `.sh` it should be executed with `sh`. `sh` might not be
available or the script might contain a hashbang for a different shell.

The idea with this PR is that nushell shouldn't assume anything about
executable files and just execute them. Later on we can think about how
non-executable files should be executed if we detect they are a script.

# User-Facing Changes

This may break some people's scripts or habits if they have wrong
assumptions about `.sh` files. We can tell them to add a hashbang and +x
bit to execute shell scripts, or prepend `bash`. If this a common
assumption something like this should be added to the book

# Tests + Formatting

I only tested manually and that did work

# After Submitting

Co-authored-by: Jelle Besseling <jelle@bigbridge.nl>
This commit is contained in:
Jelle Besseling 2023-05-03 00:56:35 +02:00 committed by GitHub
parent d45e9671d4
commit a7c1b363eb
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1 changed files with 0 additions and 34 deletions
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34
crates/nu-command/src/system/run_external.rs
View File

@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
use crate::hook::eval_hook;
use fancy_regex::Regex;
use itertools::Itertools;
use nu_engine::env_to_strings;
use nu_engine::CallExt;
use nu_protocol::{
@ -651,8 +649,6 @@ impl ExternalCommand {
} else {
self.spawn_simple_command(cwd)
}
} else if self.name.item.ends_with(".sh") {
Ok(self.spawn_sh_command())
} else {
self.spawn_simple_command(cwd)
}
@ -698,19 +694,6 @@ impl ExternalCommand {
process
}
/// Spawn a sh command with `sh -c args...`
pub fn spawn_sh_command(&self) -> std::process::Command {
let joined_and_escaped_arguments = self
.args
.iter()
.map(|arg| shell_arg_escape(&arg.item))
.join(" ");
let cmd_with_args = vec![self.name.item.clone(), joined_and_escaped_arguments].join(" ");
let mut process = std::process::Command::new("sh");
process.arg("-c").arg(cmd_with_args);
process
}
}
fn trim_expand_and_apply_arg(
@ -796,23 +779,6 @@ fn suggest_command(attempted_command: &str, engine_state: &EngineState) -> Optio
}
}
fn has_unsafe_shell_characters(arg: &str) -> bool {
let re: Regex = Regex::new(r"[^\w@%+=:,./-]").expect("regex to be valid");
re.is_match(arg).unwrap_or(false)
}
fn shell_arg_escape(arg: &str) -> String {
match arg {
"" => String::from("''"),
s if !has_unsafe_shell_characters(s) => String::from(s),
_ => {
let single_quotes_escaped = arg.split('\'').join("'\"'\"'");
format!("'{single_quotes_escaped}'")
}
}
}
/// This function returns a tuple with 3 items:
/// 1st item: trimmed string.
/// 2nd item: a boolean value indicate if it's ok to run glob expansion.